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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Marbury v. Madison: The Origins
of Judicial Review
Daniel deButts

Introduction to Marbury v. Madison
The Supreme Court of the United States is arguably one of
the United States’ most powerful institutions despite its
constitutional limitations. The Court and its nine justices have the
authority to overturn any legislative action, once it is challenged. In
the past fifty years, the Court has ruled on abortion laws, gay
marriage, and many other significant political, social, and economic
issues. Many assume that such powers were written into the very
fabric of the Constitution, yet this is not the case. Despite our
common understanding of the Court’s current powers, some lack the
historical context to appreciate the string of strategic moves that
Chief Justice John Marshall and his adversary—and cousin—
President Thomas Jefferson made over two hundred years ago.
In the years immediately following the ratification of the
United States Constitution, the Supreme Court had negligible
influence in the country. Justices were forced to travel by carriage
to different states and often settled simple discrepancies among local
farmers. This, surely, is not the Court we know today. Presently, we
know the Court almost exclusively for its ability to review
legislature and rule it unconstitutional—a process known as judicial
review.
In 1800, the Federalists lost both the presidency and their
majority in Congress in a series of landslide victories to the
Antifederalists. Lame duck President John Adams and his Federalist
Congress decided to expand the Judiciary Act of 1793 and appoint
several dozen federal judges in an effort to maintain Federalist
power in the central government. The commissions for these
“Midnight Judges” were given to Secretary of State John Marshall
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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to be issued as quickly as possible. Nonetheless, in what is often
described as a race against the clock, several of the judges, among
them William Marbury, were never given their commissions, as the
government changed hands to the Anti-federalists. President
Jefferson, upon taking office, immediately ordered his Secretary of
State James Madison not to issue the remaining commissions. The
waiting judges would never receive their positions. Of course,
Jefferson’s disdain for the judiciary is well-documented. In 1820, he
wrote in a personal letter, “the Judiciary of the US is the subtle corps
of sappers & miners constantly working underground to undermine
the foundations of our confederated fabric.”1
In the wake of Jefferson’s decision, Marbury filed suit
against Madison at the US Supreme Court and requested a writ of
mandamus, an order for the government to properly perform its
duties.2 According to Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1793, the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over federal requests writ
of mandamus. With the support of other Federalists, Marbury
demanded that Jefferson hand over the commission, so he could
become a Justice of the Peace in Washington, D.C. In a surprising
turn of events, the Anti-Federalist Congress decided to disband the
Supreme Court for their entire 1802 session.3
After a full year, the Court met again, and within a few days
Marshall declared that Marbury v. Madison (1803) would be heard.
Marshall knew that Jefferson was a strict Anti-Federalist who did
not want to see the powers of the judiciary expanded. Furthermore,
he found it possible that Jefferson would simply ignore any ruling
that wasn’t in his favor. After all, Jefferson did not issue the initial
commissions in the first place, despite the legal murkiness of the
situation. Thus, as he heard the case in the spring of 1803, Marshall
found himself trapped between two difficult decisions—issue the
mandamus and run the risk of being ignored by the executive,
effectively destroying what little authority the Court had or yield to
Jefferson and the executive branch, and similarly demonstrate the
weakness of the Court.4
After careful deliberation, Marshall and the Court reached a
unanimous 4-0 decision (there were only six judges on the Court at
the time, two of which were not present for the case). Marshall
decided that although Jefferson should be required to hand over the
commissions to Marbury and the rest of the ‘Midnight Judges,’ the
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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Supreme Court had no real authority to issue such a ruling. Marshall
asserted that Marshall asserted, according to the Constitution, the
Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction over “all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those
in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”5 Effectively, Marshall
scolded Jefferson for breaking the law, but said that the Court was
powerless to help Marbury. He declared Section 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1793 unconstitutional. In his own language, “a law repugnant
to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument” and, further, “it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”6 Despite not getting the Federalist judges in office,
Marshall managed to strengthen the Court’s powers in the long-run.
A frustrated Jefferson, in a personal letter following the decision,
retorted: “our peculiar security is in the possession of a written
constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.”7 The
author of that construction, of course, is Jefferson’s cousin—John
Marshall. The tension between the relatives would only continue to
rise. In a maneuver that changed the United States forever, Chief
Justice John Marshall outdueled President Thomas Jefferson with a
strategic move bound for the annals of history.
Introduction to Game Theory
Game Theory, a field developed in the early twentieth
century by the famous mathematician John von Neumann, is the
analysis of interactive decision making between two or more players
in a strategic game. Often, people acquire experience with game
theory by way of playing strategic games. For example, dating is
often a strategic game, as players must calculate payoffs based on
sets of decisions: Should one take their date to dinner? Bring
flowers? Go to a movie? All such decisions result in varying payoffs
based on how their opponent—in this case, their date—will react to
such moves.8 Applying such concepts to a broader scale allows
economists to analyze behavior within industries, politicians to
consider constituents’ reactions to certain regulations, and athletes
to predict their opponents’ move on the fly. All such applications
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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are starkly different, yet equally valid in their use of game theoretic
analysis.
This paper will discuss terms such as game tree, rollback
equilibrium, and payoffs. In order to use these terms fluidly, it will
define these terms with the help of Dixit et al.9 In the appendix to
this paper are three game trees. Dixit defines a game tree as “a
representation of a game in the form of nodes, branches, and
terminal nodes and their associated payoffs.” It is important to note
that game trees denote sequential games, in which players move one
at a time. A rollback equilibrium is a set of strategies “that remain
after rollback analysis has been used to prune all the branches that
can be pruned.” In its latter sections, this paper shall explain the
rollback analysis of Marbury v. Madison in explicit detail. Next, it
is essential to understand that a payoff is considered to be “the
objective, usually numerical, that a player in a game aims to
maximize.” Payoffs are the key to performing a proper rollback
analysis of any game tree and will be discussed extensively in this
paper. For the purposes of this analysis, the payoffs are calculated
in “preference order”—meaning, each payoff is listed in ranking
order of the player’s preferred outcome.
Prior Game-Theoretical Analysis of Marbury v. Madison
There is one major paper in the field that discusses Marbury
v. Madison from a game theoretic perspective. The paper, by Robert
Lowry Clinton, takes the stance that the Jefferson-Marshall battle
was less a battle and more a “tacit political compromise between
two figures who have most often been considered mortal
enemies…not a ‘game’ with a clear winner and loser.”10 This
concept is backed by Clinton’s structuring of payoffs. In preference
order, Clinton considers Marshall’s decision to reject the mandamus
and declare the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional as equally
preferred between the two actors. He assigns it a three (the second
highest preference). In turn, Clinton believes that Marshall’s highest
payoff (a score of four) occurs when he issues the Mandamus and
Jefferson complies. Both of these payoff structures indicate that
Clinton gives more weight to the appointment of judges for both
actors than to the restructuring of government authority—either in
terms of executive expansion or establishment or judicial review.
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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Another relevant paper, written by Jack Knight and Lee
Epstein, reaches beyond the scope of this paper; however, it still
incorporates useful analysis of the Jefferson-Marshall battle. The
authors widen the scope of the game to the point where Jefferson
threatens Marshall with impeachment prior to the hearing of
Marbury v. Madison. Knight and Epstein’s paper primarily focuses
on the struggle for judicial supremacy, as suggested by its title, and
simply uses Marshall versus Jefferson as a means of portraying that
struggle. At multiple points leading up to Marbury v. Madison,
Jefferson tried to force Marshall out of the Court. According to the
paper, Jefferson viewed Marshall as a “subtly calculating enemy of
the people” and a man “of strong political ambitions, capable of
bending others to his will, determined to mobilize the power of the
court by craftiness…and by making its opinion those of a conclave
which he would dominate.”11 This appears to contradict directly
Clinton’s supposition that Marshall and Jefferson made a relatively
amicable, joint decision to establish judicial review. Knight and
Epstein go so far as to say that “the new president had nothing but
contempt for the new Chief Justice.” Furthermore, the paper states
that Marshall knew that the Anti-Federalists wanted him impeached.
If this were the case, it would strengthen Marshall’s fear of
upholding the mandamus, and payoffs should be adjusted
accordingly. This paper differentiates between two classes of
motivations: the political and the institutional. To clarify, ‘political’
refers to the actors’ parties (Federalist and Anti-Federalist) and their
goals, and ‘institutional’ refers to the actors’ goals and desires for
the long-term function of the government. Knight and Epstein
conclude that Jefferson preferred (1) that the judgeships be voided
and (2) that the size of government be maintained or, preferably,
reduced. On the other hand, Marshall preferred (1) that the
Federalists fill the judgeships and (2) that the size of government be
expanded and, more specifically, that the judicial branch bolster its
authority. These distinctions are important and must be factored into
a single payoff structure. Later, this paper shall discuss the
parameters of preference for both Jefferson and Marshall and how
the ‘political’ and ‘institutional’ goals are given weight in a payoff
calculation.
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A Novel Analysis of Marbury v. Madison
To properly review all aspects of this paper’s revised game
tree for Marbury v. Madison, this paper will first describe the
structure of the game trees attached in the appendices to this paper—
Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C. In analyzing the game
between Jefferson and Marshall, this paper shows that they played
the game with asymmetric information in which Marshall has
complete information on the structure of the game—or, arguably, a
second-mover advantage, which will be explained in greater
detail—and Jefferson lacks a specific information set that is critical
to the outcome of the game. First, this paper will look at the structure
of the trees, then analyze the payoffs (which are identical in all three
games) and, lastly, perform a rollback analysis of the game.
The game begins with Marbury’s decision to sue Madison
for his commission. Jefferson has two choices: to issue the
commissions to the remaining midnight judges or not to issue them.
If he chooses to issue the commissions, then the game is complete,
and Marshall has no further moves, since there are no grounds for a
legal case. If, however, Jefferson does not issue the commissions,
Marshall then has the opportunity to hear the case in the Supreme
Court. Here, from Jefferson’s perspective at the beginning of the
game, Marshall has two choices: issue the requested writ of
mandamus or reject it. If Marshall rejects the mandamus, then it is
apparent to all parties that the game would be over, for Jefferson
would be satisfied with the decision and not take further action. On
the other hand, if Marshall upholds the mandamus, Jefferson then
has the option to either overrule the Court and ignore the ruling or
uphold the mandamus, concede to the Court, and deliver the
commissions. In either case, the game ends there. The third option
for Marshall, denoted by the dotted line (to represent the asymmetric
information set), is unbeknownst to Jefferson at the beginning of the
game: Marshall can simultaneously reject the mandamus and rule
that the Judiciary Act of 1793 was unconstitutional, or as he
succinctly concluded his lengthy decision, “the rule must be
discharged.”12
The important claim here is that Jefferson lacked
information from the beginning. Clinton, in his analysis, believes
this is not the case: “it must appear less likely that Jefferson and
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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Madison would have been incognizant of the alternatives available
to the Court, and so less likely that Jefferson would have allowed
himself to be outpointed by the chief justice in the situation.” In his
paper, Clinton bases this conjecture off the fact that Charles Lee,
part of Marbury’s representation in Court, remarked during the oral
arguments, “Congress is not restrained from conferring original
jurisdiction in other cases than those mentioned in the constitution.”
This excerpt appears to envisage Marshall’s crafty decision;
however, it does not support Clinton’s claim that Jefferson knew
about the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1793. In fact, this could only possibly support the notion that
Charles Lee knew at the time, which, of course, means that during
oration, Marshall and Jefferson may have learned of the opportunity
to claim unconstitutionality for the first time. This paper makes no
claim as to that fact; but this insight could have led to a supposed
“second-mover advantage.” If Marshall and Jefferson both learned
of the unconstitutionality at the same time (during oration), then the
choice only presented itself during Marshall’s turn, which allowed
him greater flexibility in his decision-making process and
simultaneously limited Jefferson’s ability to make rational choices
at the beginning of the game.
This turns out to be the single most important event in the
game. This paper argues that had Jefferson known about Marshall’s
third option, he would have readily chosen to issue the commissions
in the first place.
In Appendices A, B, and C, the structure of the tree and the
payoffs are exactly the same. In each appendix, however, the
rollback analysis is changed, and, therefore, so is the final result of
the game. In Appendix A, the tree is viewed from Jefferson’s
perspective; in Appendix B, the tree is constructed based on how
Jefferson would have acted if he had known about the missing
information set; and in Appendix C, the game is shown as Jefferson
and Marshall truly played it in 1803.
Now, because the payoffs stay the same in each Appendix,
this paper will argue for the structure of the payoffs here. As you
refer to the table in the bottom right corner of each appendix, you
will see that the top letters refer to Jefferson (J) and Marshall (M).
These correspond to the letters at every decision node. Furthermore,
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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the payoffs are ranked in preference order; a payoff of four is most
preferable to the actor, while a payoff of zero is least preferable.
It is widely known that the Founding Fathers knew that their
actions would set precedents far into the future. George Washington
was once quoted as saying, “there is scarcely any part of my conduct
which may not be hereafter drawn into precedent.”13 It is not hard to
extrapolate from this quote that many of the framers, including
Jefferson and Marshall, had a very similar mindset. It has been said
that Marshall, in understanding the weight of his positions,
“invented, in an era without precedent, the legal principle that
form[s] the foundations of American constitutional and international
law today.”14 At the time, our young democracy was just starting to
establish precedents in every facet of government—and Marshall
and Jefferson knew it.
With that in mind, a relatively incontestable payoff structure
can be established, which allows us to continue with the rollback
analysis of the game. Two items have been taken into consideration:
first, that the two players care most about the long-term function of
the government; and second, that the two players have different
desires to appoint or not to appoint Federalist Justices of the Peace.
The payoffs are listed according to preference order; thus, a zero is
least preferable and a four is most preferable. The payoff tables are
constant across all appendices and their tables.
Starting with Jefferson’s payoffs, a four is assigned to the
outcome in which Jefferson does not issue the commissions and
Marshall rejects the mandamus. This is Jefferson’s best payoff
because the government does not expand its judicial or executive
authority, and the Justices of the Peace are not issued their
commissions. As mentioned before, Jefferson did not particularly
like the judiciary branch; he is quoted as saying that “the judiciary
bodies were supposed to the most helpless members of the
government…experience, however, soon showed in what way they
were to become the most dangerous.”15 Presumably, Jefferson’s
“experience” –– presumably his interaction with Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison –– demonstrated the strength of the Court.
Jefferson’s next best outcome occurs when he issues the
commissions (a value of three), in the first place. This payoff
deviates from Clinton’s structure, and that is because in this
outcome, Jefferson cedes the judgeships, but neither the executive
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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nor the judiciary are expanded. After that, Jefferson’s third best
outcome (a value of two) happens when Jefferson does not issue the
commissions, Marshall upholds the mandamus, and then Jefferson
overrules Marshall’s verdict. This is good for Jefferson that the
judges are not put into place, yet it is certainly worse than the
previous outcome because the precedent is now set for the executive
branch to have the authority to overrule the judiciary. In the longterm, the Supreme Court will be exceptionally weak, but the
executive powers will have expanded. From Jefferson’s AntiFederalist perspective, any imbalance or expansion of federal power
is considered a negative outcome. Jefferson’s second worst outcome
comes when he does not issue the commission, Marshall upholds the
mandamus, and Jefferson yields to the Court (a value of one). This
is a near-disaster for Jefferson because the justices of the peace are
given their commissions, and the Supreme Court establishes
authority over the executive branch. In doing so, the formerly weak
Supreme Court is now a source of authority. Surely, Jefferson would
have loathed this possibility. Lastly, Jefferson would have had the
least preference for the true historical outcome (a value of zero). In
this scenario, Jefferson does not issue the commissions, and then
Marshall rejects the mandamus and concurrently establishes judicial
review by declaring the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional. Here
Marshall vastly expands the power of the judiciary and shifts the
balance of power in government unlike any other outcome.
Although the judges are not appointed, Jefferson still does not prefer
to have the governmental structure reorganized and skewed toward
the judicial branch.
From Marshall’s perspective, the payoffs are almost
perfectly reversible. Marshall’s most preferable outcome is to
establish judicial review (a value of four). As mentioned earlier,
Marshall was a staunch advocate of the Supreme Court and of
Federalist ideologies, thus the establishment of judicial review is his
best outcome. Next, he would prefer that Jefferson not issue the
commissions, then Marshall would uphold the mandamus, and
finally Jefferson would agree to issue the commissions (a value of
three). This is Marshall’s second-most preferred outcome because
the power of the judiciary is respected by Jefferson and the
judgeships are issued. Next, Marshall would prefer that Jefferson
issue the commissions in the first place (a value of two). In this
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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scenario, the Court’s power is not expanded, but the justices of the
peace are given their commissions. Marshall’s second-to-least
preferable outcome occurs when Jefferson does not issue the
commissions, and Marshall rejects the mandamus (a value of one).
The Supreme Court does not gain authority and the judgeships are
not issued—both poor outcomes for Marshall. However, this is still
better than the least preferable outcome, which occurs when
Jefferson does not issue the commissions, Marshall upholds the
mandamus, and then Jefferson overrules the Court (a value of zero).
In this scenario, the judges are not appointed, and the Court becomes
effectively obsolete by way of executive expansion. It is true that
some Federalists may have seen this as a partial win due to the
increase in executive authority and overall government influence,
but Marshall, as a member of and advocate for the Supreme Court,
certainly would not have preferred this outcome.
With the payoffs established, this paper moves to review the
rollback analysis of the three different game trees in the appendices
to this paper. In all three appendices, Jefferson’s payoff is the first
number in the set, and Marshall’s payoff is the second number. For
example, in set (3,2), Jefferson receives the three and Marshall
receives the two. The same goes for set (1,3), where Jefferson
receives the one, and Marshall receives the three.
In Appendix A, the game tree has been structured from
Jefferson’s point of view. As mentioned earlier, the dotted line
denotes an information set that Jefferson does not have at the start
of the game. From Jefferson’s perspective, starting with the last
decision node, Jefferson knows that he would choose to overrule the
mandamus, resulting in payoff (2,0). This line has been bolded to
symbolize the selected choice, and any non-bolded lines have
effectively been pruned from the game tree. Then Jefferson believes
that Marshall is choosing between “Uphold → Overrule” and
“Reject,” for a payoff of zero or one respectively. Here Jefferson
believes Marshall will choose to reject, for it would result in a higher
payoff for Marshall. Finally, Jefferson is deciding between “Issue”
for a payoff of three or “Don’t Issue → Reject” for a payoff of four.
Obviously, Jefferson will choose the higher payoff and opt to not
issue the commissions and wait for Marshall to reject the
mandamus. With the information that Jefferson has available to him,
this is a highly rational decision.
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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However, with full information given to both players, the
outcome of the game would change. In Appendix B, the game tree
has been changed to reflect a game played with symmetric
information. In this game, the first part of the rollback analysis
remains the same. Jefferson would choose to overrule Marshall for
outcome (2,0). Then, rationally, Marshall would choose to reject the
mandamus and concurrently establish judicial review by way of
declaring the Judiciary Act of 1793 unconstitutional for outcome
(0,4). For Jefferson, the decision is now between issuing the
commissions for outcome (3,2) and not issuing the commissions and
receiving (0,4). In this scenario, Jefferson would clearly choose set
(3,2) and opt to issue the commissions from at the commencement
of the game.
Finally, in Appendix C, is the game as played in reality. In
this version of the game Jefferson does not know that Marshall can
establish judicial review, so he will operate with the same rationality
as Appendix A. He believes that he is choosing between “Issue” for
payoff (3,2) and “Don’t Issue → Reject" for payoff (4,1). However,
as previously discussed, Marshall is either granted a second-mover
advantage via oral arguments, or he skillfully develops a new move
and carefully conceals information about the move from Jefferson.
Regardless of how or when Marshall accesses the information,
Jefferson will choose to not issue the commissions and pursue
outcome (4,1)—his best and most preferable choice. Then, Marshall
will decide to reject the mandamus and establish judicial review and
the game ends with payoff (0,4). In this way, Jefferson is quickly
shifted from picking between his most preferable and second-most
preferable choice, to receiving his least preferable payoff.
Unbeknownst to the players at the time, the ramifications of
Jefferson’s lack of information would be monumental to the
establishment of today’s Supreme Court and would forever change
the course of American history.
Implications
The analysis of the strategic interaction between Jefferson
and Marshall, as discussed above, provides us with a multitude of
insights as basic as rethinking Marbury v. Madison and as deep as
bettering our understanding of the inner workings of the American
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
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government. First, this analysis offers a better understanding of
Marshall, Jefferson, and the entirety of the Marbury v. Madison
decision. This paper argues that Jefferson was not necessarily
‘outfoxed’ by Marshall in their interaction, but that Marshall could
have been granted a second-move advantage. Furthermore, this
paper can help us better understand inter-institutional relationships
and strategies. As detailed above, it is clear that governmental
bodies communicate both explicitly and implicitly and, in doing do,
help shape the future of policy in the United States. In studying
interactions such as Jefferson and Marshall’s in the early nineteenth
century, we can better understand our current government and the
way that politicians connect in the political sphere. Similarly, this
analysis presents demonstrable evidence that even non-elected
officials, such as Supreme Court justices, often strategize in a way
that is most characteristic of elected officials. In this analysis,
Marshall clearly understood that he was pitted against Jefferson and
decided to play a political game in which the Supreme Court was to
come out on top. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this paper
provides insight into the decision-making process of Supreme Court
justices. In analyzing Marshall’s strategic choices throughout the
course of the game, we can see that he was explicitly influenced by
his environment. He clearly considered that Jefferson and the AntiFederalists were his opponents and countered Jefferson accordingly.
This fact is not to be taken lightly. If we extrapolate this
understanding into modern-day politics, then it is important to
recognize that Supreme Court justices can be manipulated by their
environment. Their decisions are not made in a vacuum—if enough
pressure exists, it is possible to alter their verdicts and thus influence
the entire nation.
Ultimately, the purpose of the presented paper is to
encourage a rethinking of the strategic interaction between Marshall
and Jefferson. This paper posits that Jefferson and Marshall were
acutely aware of the fact that their decisions were an important
indicator to future generations about how the government should
and would function. They both desired, primarily, to uphold their
institutional agenda and were only secondarily concerned with the
true outcome of Marbury v. Madison in regard to the justices of the
peace. Whereas Jefferson ended up with his least favorable
outcome, however, Marshall became a historic champion of the
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2
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supreme Court. He very well may remain the figure in whose
shadow judges will forever dwell. Marshall’s victory over Jefferson
in 1803 has long defined the supreme Court, and, with lessons
learned from this paper, we know that the highly unstable and
manipulable environment in which we all live will influence the
future of decision-making in the Court.
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